Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.05.005zbMath1394.91054OpenAlexW2277478960MaRDI QIDQ738930

Raphael Boleslavsky, Tracy R. Lewis

Publication date: 16 August 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.005

zbMATH Keywords

influenceadvocacylong-term advisory relationshipmulti-period delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic delegation with a persistent state

Cites Work

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