Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
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Publication:4610566
DOI10.1093/restud/rds021zbMath1405.91071OpenAlexW2273196626MaRDI QIDQ4610566
Maher Said, Raphael Boleslavsky
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1e3b7f0063aa5054bf66f5c313386c918b1613eb
asymmetric informationlong-term contractsdynamic mechanism designsequential screeningdynamic incentives
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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