A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105196zbMATH Open1461.91171OpenAlexW3132304794MaRDI QIDQ2025005FDOQ2025005

Authors: Rohit Lamba, Ilia Krasikov 

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed017:1544

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationdynamic mechanism designfinancial constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

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Cited In (13)

• Financial Markets and Wages
• Verifying the state of financing constraints: evidence from U.S. business credit contracts
• Contraction: On the decision-theoretical origins of minimal change and entrenchment
• Finance and economic growth in a dynamic game
• Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints
• Book Review: Contract theory in continuous-time models
• Dynamic financial constraints: distinguishing mechanism design from exogenously incomplete regimes
• A dynamic model of soft budget-constraint
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
• Choices in contractivity theory
• Investment and financing decisions under optimal long-term contracting
• Raising and allocation capital principles as optimal managerial contracts

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