A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
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Publication:1572943
DOI10.21034/sr.259 10.1006/jeth.1999.2619; 10.21034/sr.259zbMath1006.91052MaRDI QIDQ1572943
Publication date: 6 August 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.259
91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)
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