A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
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Publication:1572943
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2619zbMath1006.91052OpenAlexW3121207922MaRDI QIDQ1572943
Publication date: 6 August 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.259
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- Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
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- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- Incentives and Aggregate Shocks
- Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
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