Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.07.008MaRDI QIDQ2490130zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthias Doepke, Robert M. Townsend

Publication date 28 April 2006

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp818.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic contractsMechanism designRecursive contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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Cites work

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• Approximation Schemes for Infinite Linear Programs
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Computing Supergame Equilibria
• Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
• Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
• Efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Multistage Games with Communication
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing
• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(17)

• Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
• A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
• Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
• Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
• Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
• Analysis of a dynamic adverse selection model with asymptotic efficiency
• A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model with Hidden Information: Sequential Optimality Through Truthful State Revelation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1341045 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem
• Optimal asset management contracts with hidden savings
• Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
• Technical Note—Dynamic Mechanism Design with Capacity Constraint
• Implementing deterministic outcomes in stochastic dynamic environments
• Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
• A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
• Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation
• An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance

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