Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
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Publication:2490130
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.07.008zbMath1108.91050OpenAlexW3123512418MaRDI QIDQ2490130
Robert M. Townsend, Matthias Doepke
Publication date: 28 April 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp818.pdf
Related Items (7)
Analysis of a Dynamic Adverse Selection Model with Asymptotic Efficiency ⋮ A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model ⋮ Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation ⋮ Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions ⋮ An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance ⋮ Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment ⋮ Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
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