An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
From MaRDI portal
Publication:975922
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2009.10.005zbMath1230.91097OpenAlexW3122279400MaRDI QIDQ975922
Marcus Hagedorn, Tim Mennel, Ashok Kaul
Publication date: 11 June 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp_iew/iewwp237.pdf
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