Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
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Publication:751456
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90023-DzbMath0714.90008MaRDI QIDQ751456
Tim Worrall, Jonathan P. Thomas
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B16: Utility theory
90C39: Dynamic programming
91B62: Economic growth models
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
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- On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
