Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
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Cites work
- A law of large numbers in the theory of consumer's choice under uncertainty
- Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3793736 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53571 (Why is no real title available?)
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
- Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction
- Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
- Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing
- Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
Cited in
(59)- Communication, commitment, and growth
- On the long run implications of repeated moral hazard
- Credible monetary policy in an infinite horizon model: Recursive approaches
- Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
- Ex ante payments in self-enforcing risk-sharing contracts
- Non-existence of recursive equilibria on compact state spaces when markets are incomplete.
- A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
- Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
- Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
- Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts
- On increasing risk, inequality and poverty measures: peacocks, lyrebirds and exotic options
- Investment and bilateral insurance
- On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information
- Default and efficient debt markets.
- Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans's dilemma
- A dynamic theory of war and peace
- Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
- Solving the income fluctuation problem with unbounded rewards
- A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
- On the value of repetition for communication games
- Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
- Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
- Even up: maintaining relationships
- Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
- From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
- Default and aggregate income
- Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions
- Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
- Money, markets, and dynamic credit
- Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance
- EFFICIENCY–EQUALITY TRADE-OFF OF SOCIAL INSURANCE
- Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: family size and per capita consumption
- A theory of political and economic cycles
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
- Dynamic double auctions: toward first best
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Power fluctuations and political economy
- A NOTE ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE TOBIN EFFECT IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS
- Aggregate fluctuations, interest rates, and repeated insurance under private information
- Aggregate fluctuations, interest rates, and repeated insurance under private information
- Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
- Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence
- Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model
- A dynamic model of unsecured credit
- Fiscal rules and discretion under limited enforcement
- Relational contracts: public versus private savings
- Implementing deterministic outcomes in stochastic dynamic environments
- Gaussian agency problems with memory and linear contracts
- Optimal banking with delegated monitoring
- Dynamic communication with trading commissions
- Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
- Screening for breakthroughs
- Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints
- Repeated delegation
- Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
- Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information
- Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design
- An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
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