Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment
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Publication:2323289
DOI10.1007/S00199-018-1112-1zbMath1422.91383OpenAlexW2794953272MaRDI QIDQ2323289
Pedro Hemsley, Eduardo Zilberman, Vinicius Carrasco
Publication date: 30 August 2019
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1112-1
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