Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00204zbMath1005.91070OpenAlexW3123231714MaRDI QIDQ4542457

Ethan Ligon, Tim Worrall, Jonathan P. Thomas

Publication date: 1 August 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00204

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic modelinformal insuranceconsumption allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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