Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
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Publication:4542457
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00204zbMath1005.91070MaRDI QIDQ4542457
Ethan Ligon, Tim Worrall, Jonathan P. Thomas
Publication date: 1 August 2002
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00204
91B42: Consumer behavior, demand theory
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