Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.08.007zbMATH Open1457.91401OpenAlexW3083758035MaRDI QIDQ2222211FDOQ2222211

Authors: Junichi Fujimoto, Junsang Lee 

Publication date: 26 January 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.08.007

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zbMATH Keywords

social welfarelimited commitmentdynamic contractmicrofinance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Credit risk (91G40) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

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• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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• Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
• Lagrange multipliers in infinite horizon discrete time optimal control models
• A Rawlsian Intertemporal Consumption Rule
• Long-term relationships as safeguards
• Lagrange multipliers in incentive-constrained problems
• Group lending, matching patterns, and the mystery of microcredit: evidence from Thailand

Cited In (3)

• Strategic default, multiple installments, and the role of informal moneylender in microcredit contract
• When to seek expert advice? A simple model of borrowers with limited liability
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

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