Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.05.003MaRDI QIDQ6160141zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ahmet Altınok

Publication date 23 June 2023

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.003

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectiongroup lendingjoint liabilitymatchingmicrofinance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69) Credit risk (91G40)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854747

Cites work

• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Group lending, matching patterns, and the mystery of microcredit: evidence from Thailand

Cited in

(13)

• Joint liability among bank borrowers
• Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment
• Group lending with endogenous group size
• Optimal group size in microlending
• Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research
• Contract structure, risk-sharing, and investment choice
• Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements
• Student loans: When is risk sharing desirable?
• The economic returns to social interaction: experimental evidence from microfinance
• Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies
• Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection
• Group lending, matching patterns, and the mystery of microcredit: evidence from Thailand
• Improving Risk Sharing and Borrower Incentives in Mortgage Design

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