Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.05.010MaRDI QIDQ485567zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, R. Lensink

Publication date 12 January 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

credit rationingjoint liabilityasymmetry of informationcosigninggroup lendingmicro finance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Credit risk (91G40) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection

Cited in

(6)

• Group lending with endogenous group size
• Selection into and across credit contracts: theory and field research
• Group lending, matching patterns, and the mystery of microcredit: evidence from Thailand
• Strategic default, multiple installments, and the role of informal moneylender in microcredit contract
• Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection
• Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing

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