Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics
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Publication:4823476
DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00285zbMath1096.91039MaRDI QIDQ4823476
Rui Albuquerque, Hugo A. Hopenhayn
Publication date: 28 October 2004
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_493.pdf
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