Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors
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Publication:2022926
DOI10.1007/s10436-020-00365-1zbMath1461.91345OpenAlexW3027640408MaRDI QIDQ2022926
Rui Li, Chong Lai, Yong-Hong Wu
Publication date: 3 May 2021
Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-020-00365-1
Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
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