The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
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Publication:1317329
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1072zbMath0790.90015OpenAlexW2049770619MaRDI QIDQ1317329
Jaeyoung Sung, Heinz Schättler
Publication date: 23 June 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1072
moral hazardnecessary and sufficient conditions for optimalityexponential utilityprincipal-agent problemscontinuous-time/dynamic settingsemi-martingale representation of the agent's salary
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