Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2351400
DOI10.1007/s11579-014-0138-9zbMath1315.91038OpenAlexW2058132532MaRDI QIDQ2351400
Publication date: 23 June 2015
Published in: Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-014-0138-9
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Decentralization and collusion
- The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
- Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
- The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
- Optimal Contracts for Teams
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Incentives in Teams
- The Firm as a Communication Network
This page was built for publication: Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
