Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
DOI10.1007/S00245-008-9050-0zbMATH Open1166.49024OpenAlexW2138209183MaRDI QIDQ2391249FDOQ2391249
Authors: Jakša Cvitanić, Xuhu Wan, Jianfeng Zhang 
Publication date: 24 July 2009
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.387.3905
Recommendations
stochastic maximum principlemoral hazardprincipal-agent problemshidden actionforward-backward SDEssecond-best optimal contracts and incentives
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Cited In (27)
- Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
- Mean-field leader-follower games with terminal state constraint
- Dynamic contracting: accidents lead to nonlinear contracts
- Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal
- Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
- Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
- Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
- Agent's optimal compensation under inflation risk by using dynamic contract model
- The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability
- Contract theory in continuous-time models
- A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
- Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
- Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
- Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
- Optimal contracts in continuous-time models
- Time-inconsistent contract theory
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
- Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
- A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
- A variational approach to contracting under imperfect observations
- Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
- On the study of a single-period principal-agent model with taxation
- Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
- A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem
- Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
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