Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3531161 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1325009 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(27)- Contract theory in continuous-time models
- Agent's optimal compensation under inflation risk by using dynamic contract model
- Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
- Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks
- A variational approach to contracting under imperfect observations
- Optimal contracts in continuous-time models
- A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem
- A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
- Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents
- Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
- A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
- Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
- Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
- Time-inconsistent contract theory
- Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
- Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
- The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability
- Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
- Dynamic contracting: accidents lead to nonlinear contracts
- On the study of a single-period principal-agent model with taxation
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
- Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting
- Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems
- Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal
- Mean-field leader-follower games with terminal state constraint
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