Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
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Publication:2391249
DOI10.1007/s00245-008-9050-0zbMath1166.49024OpenAlexW2138209183MaRDI QIDQ2391249
Jianfeng Zhang, Xuhu Wan, Jakša Cvitanić
Publication date: 24 July 2009
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.387.3905
stochastic maximum principlemoral hazardprincipal-agent problemshidden actionforward-backward SDEssecond-best optimal contracts and incentives
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