Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
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ContractsMoral hazardAdverse selectionContinuous-time modelsManagers compensationPrincipal-agent problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 50791 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1095739 (Why is no real title available?)
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems
- Corporate insurance and managerial incentives
- Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
- Dynamic Programming Conditions for Partially Observable Stochastic Systems
- MUTUAL FUND PORTFOLIO CHOICE IN THE PRESENCE OF DYNAMIC FLOWS
- Moral hazard with bounded payments
- On optimal sharing rules in discrete- and continuous-time principal-agent problems with exponential utility
- Optimal contracts in continuous-time models
- Optimal risk-sharing with effort and project choice
- The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
- The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
Cited in
(26)- Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
- Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
- Moral hazard under ambiguity
- Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal
- Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies
- Agent's optimal compensation under inflation risk by using dynamic contract model
- A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring
- A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
- Analysis of a dynamic adverse selection model with asymptotic efficiency
- Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors
- Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard
- Optimal contracts to a principal-agent model with a diffusion coefficient affected by firm size
- Optimal contracts in continuous-time models
- Only time will tell: a theory of deferred compensation
- Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty
- Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present
- Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
- Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
- Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
- A variational approach to contracting under imperfect observations
- Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
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