Only time will tell: a theory of deferred compensation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA043zbMATH Open1504.91145OpenAlexW3121262926MaRDI QIDQ5049097FDOQ5049097

Authors: Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst, Marcus M. Opp 

Publication date: 11 November 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa043

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zbMATH Keywords

persistencemoral hazardprincipal-agent modelsinformativeness principlecompensation designduration of pay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cited In (3)

• Optimal insurance contracts for a shot-noise Cox claim process and persistent insured's actions
• A theory of optimal deadlines
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents

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