Only time will tell: a theory of deferred compensation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA043MaRDI QIDQ5049097zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst, Marcus M. Opp

Publication date 11 November 2022

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa043

zbMATH Keywords

persistencemoral hazardprincipal-agent modelsinformativeness principlecompensation designduration of pay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
• Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
• Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
• Myopic agency
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach

Cited in

(3)

• Optimal insurance contracts for a shot-noise Cox claim process and persistent insured's actions
• A theory of optimal deadlines
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents

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