Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.004zbMATH Open1330.91096OpenAlexW2050772106MaRDI QIDQ900602FDOQ900602

Authors Daniel F. Garrett, A. Pavan

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionadverse selectionincentivesmoral hazarddynamic mechanism designpersistent productivity shocks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
• Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond
• A variational approach to contracting under imperfect observations

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3281211 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
• Regulation of a risk averse firm
• Repeated Moral Hazard
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Cited in

(19)

• Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
• A variational approach to contracting under imperfect observations
• Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects
• Performance cycles
• A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
• Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
• Dynamic risk taking with bonus schemes
• A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
• Only time will tell: a theory of deferred compensation
• Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contracts
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
• Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
• Robust contracting with additive noise
• A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
• How to share it out: the value of information in teams
• Optimal Ratcheting in Executive Compensation
• Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking

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