Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
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Publication:900602
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.004zbMATH Open1330.91096OpenAlexW2050772106MaRDI QIDQ900602FDOQ900602
Authors: Daniel F. Garrett, A. Pavan 
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.004
Recommendations
risk aversionadverse selectionincentivesmoral hazarddynamic mechanism designpersistent productivity shocks
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Cited In (18)
- Managerial Incentives, Investment and Aggregate Implications: Scale Effects
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
- A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
- Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contracts
- Robust contracting with additive noise
- Only time will tell: a theory of deferred compensation
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Optimal stopping with private information
- Relational contracts in a persistent environment
- Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
- A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
- A variational approach to contracting under imperfect observations
- Dynamic risk taking with bonus schemes
- How to share it out: the value of information in teams
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