Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
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Publication:900602
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.004zbMath1330.91096OpenAlexW2050772106MaRDI QIDQ900602
Daniel F. Garrett, Alessandro Pavan
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.004
risk aversionmoral hazardadverse selectionincentivesdynamic mechanism designpersistent productivity shocks
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Related Items (10)
Relational contracts in a persistent environment ⋮ Robust contracting with additive noise ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Optimal stopping with private information ⋮ Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach ⋮ A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model ⋮ A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity ⋮ A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints ⋮ How to share it out: the value of information in teams ⋮ Ambiguity in dynamic contracts
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