Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.08.004MaRDI QIDQ1007324zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuzhe Zhang

Publication date 20 March 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

persistencestochastic control problemprincipal-agent problemefficiency lines

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic systems and control (93E99) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks
• Persistent private information
• A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
• Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond
• A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 46120 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions
• Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information
• Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• Markov Chains
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation
• Optimal taxation with endogenous insurance markets
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation

Cited in

(16)

• Efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks: a first-order approach
• On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
• Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks
• Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
• A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
• Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
• A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity
• Persistent private information
• Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty
• A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory
• Optimal contracts with shirking
• Analysis of a dynamic adverse selection model with asymptotic efficiency
• Relational enforcement
• Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
• Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach

This page was built for publication: Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1007324)