Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
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Publication:4683686
DOI10.3982/TE737zbMath1397.91463MaRDI QIDQ4683686
Publication date: 21 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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