Inducing Environmental Disclosures: A Dynamic Mechanism Design Approach

DOI10.1287/opre.2016.1476zbMath1342.91028OpenAlexW2290741393MaRDI QIDQ5740216

Shouqiang Wang, Francis de Véricourt, Peng Sun

Publication date: 25 July 2016

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/581be1b21d2c56129db2cab019b8f17fc4f58648

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlasymmetric informationdynamic mechanism designenvironmental regulationvoluntary disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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