Optimal Monitoring Schedule in Dynamic Contracts
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Publication:5144766
DOI10.1287/OPRE.2019.1968zbMath1455.90080OpenAlexW2762772232MaRDI QIDQ5144766
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Publication date: 19 January 2021
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1968
optimal controlprincipal-agent modelmoral hazardcontinuous timedynamic contractcostly state verification
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Cites Work
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