Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring
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Publication:337806
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.08.003zbMATH Open1371.91122OpenAlexW3123476291MaRDI QIDQ337806FDOQ337806
Authors: Tomasz Piskorski, Mark M. Westerfield 
Publication date: 3 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.003
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Cited In (31)
- Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection
- Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
- Scale effects in dynamic contracting
- Relational enforcement
- Double moral hayard, monitoring and the nature of contracts
- Wasserstein convergence rates for random bit approximations of continuous Markov processes
- Optimal contracts with random monitoring
- A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring
- Dynamic contracts with random monitoring
- Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
- Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard
- Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms
- Conditional Monitoring Policy Under Moral Hazard
- Risk aversion with nothing to lose
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
- A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
- General diffusion processes as limit of time-space Markov chains
- Research on investment incorporating both environmental performance and long (short) term financial performance of firms
- Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
- Security design and firm dynamics under long-term moral hazard
- Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
- Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts
- Monitoring innovation
- Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts
- Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
- Optimal monitoring schedule in dynamic contracts
- Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
- Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
- A functional limit theorem for coin tossing Markov chains
- Termination as an incentive device
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