Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.003zbMath1371.91122MaRDI QIDQ337806

Tomasz Piskorski, Mark M. Westerfield

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazard; monitoring; dynamic contracts; endogenous financing constraints; managerial compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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