Optimal contracts with random monitoring

DOI10.1007/S00182-021-00787-9zbMath1484.91245OpenAlexW3190953262MaRDI QIDQ2121460

Andrei Barbos

Publication date: 4 April 2022

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00787-9

zbMATH Keywords

optimal controlmoral hazardoptimal contractsrandom monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (1)

Monitoring innovation

Cites Work

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• Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship
• Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
• Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis
• A Survey of the Maximum Principles for Optimal Control Problems with State Constraints
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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