Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3763855
DOI10.2307/2297481zbMath0627.90005MaRDI QIDQ3763855
Publication date: 1987
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297481
91B16: Utility theory
Related Items
Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification, Don't ask, don't tell: sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer, Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition, Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design, Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system, Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement, Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting, Optimal multilateral contracts, Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness., Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide, Optimal contracts with random monitoring, Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting, Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes, Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments, The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity, Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing, The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification, GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT
