Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
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Publication:814831
DOI10.1007/s00712-005-0128-8zbMath1132.91518MaRDI QIDQ814831
Publication date: 7 February 2006
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-005-0128-8
Related Items
Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system, Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
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