Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1zbMATH Open0533.90022OpenAlexW2072855188MaRDI QIDQ790025FDOQ790025

Authors: Joseph Greenberg 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1

Recommendations

• A game theoretical model of interaction between taxpayers and the tax authority
• Mathematical models for organizing the tax service
• Tax auditing models with the application of theory of search
• A stochastic game model of tax evasion
• Optimal tax inspection strategy

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chaintax evasionstationary Nash equilibriumAudited individualsauditing schemetax avoidance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Trade models (91B60)

Cited In (13)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Optimal dynamic tax evasion
• Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
• Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions
• Tax evasion, tax competition and gains from nondiscrimination with equilibrium mixed strategies
• On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
• Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
• A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior
• Tax evasion by risk-averse firms in Greece: a discrete Markov-based optimization model
• Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion
• Tax evasion and the prisoner's dilemma
• Dynamic history-dependent tax and environmental compliance monitoring of risk-averse firms
• Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system

This page was built for publication: Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q790025)