Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1MaRDI QIDQ790025zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph Greenberg

Publication date 1984

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chaintax evasionstationary Nash equilibriumAudited individualsauditing schemetax avoidance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Trade models (91B60)

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(14)

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• A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem
• Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
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• Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion
• Tax evasion and the prisoner's dilemma
• A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior
• Optimal dynamic tax evasion
• On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
• Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints
• Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions

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