Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:790025
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1zbMath0533.90022MaRDI QIDQ790025
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1
Markov chain; tax evasion; stationary Nash equilibrium; Audited individuals; auditing scheme; tax avoidance
Related Items
Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions, A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior, On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents, Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion, Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system, Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints, Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing, Tax evasion by risk-averse firms in Greece: a discrete Markov-based optimization model