Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions

DOI10.1111/IJET.12256zbMATH Open1530.91465OpenAlexW3011831436WikidataQ109151726 ScholiaQ109151726MaRDI QIDQ6074895FDOQ6074895

Authors: Tsaur-Chin Wu 

Publication date: 19 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12256

Recommendations

• Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes
• Taxation, capital accumulation, environment and unemployment in an efficiency wage model
• Optimal tax schemes and the environmental externality
• Environmental tax interactions when pollution affects health or productivity
• Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling under Monopoly Unions
• Environmental policy and labour market imperfection
• Taxation, unemployment, and growth: Dynamic welfare effects of ``green policies
• Optimal tax policy under heterogeneous environmental preferences
• Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 824672

zbMATH Keywords

labor uniontax compliancepollution tax evasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulb and paper industry in Quebec
• Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
• Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
• Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
• Enforcement and over-compliance
• Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes
• EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level noncompliance
• Labour union, entry and consumer welfare
• A theory of filtered enforcement
• Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?
• A note on franchising and wage bargaining

Cited In (1)

• Dynamic history-dependent tax and environmental compliance monitoring of risk-averse firms

This page was built for publication: Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6074895)