Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions

DOI10.1111/IJET.12256MaRDI QIDQ6074895zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Tsaur-Chin Wu

Publication date 19 October 2023

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12256

zbMATH Keywords

labor uniontax compliancepollution tax evasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes
• Taxation, capital accumulation, environment and unemployment in an efficiency wage model
• Optimal tax schemes and the environmental externality
• Environmental tax interactions when pollution affects health or productivity
• Pollution Taxation and Revenue Recycling under Monopoly Unions
• Environmental policy and labour market imperfection
• Taxation, unemployment, and growth: Dynamic welfare effects of ``green policies
• Optimal tax policy under heterogeneous environmental preferences
• Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 824672

Cites work

• A note on franchising and wage bargaining
• A theory of filtered enforcement
• Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
• Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?
• EPA effectiveness at reducing the duration of plant-level noncompliance
• Enforcement and over-compliance
• Environmental inspections and emissions of the pulb and paper industry in Quebec
• Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
• Labour union, entry and consumer welfare
• Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes
• Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance
• The bargaining problem

Cited in

(1)

• Dynamic history-dependent tax and environmental compliance monitoring of risk-averse firms

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