Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes

DOI10.1016/0095-0696(78)90003-7MaRDI QIDQ1250792zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jon D. Harford

Publication date 1978

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(78)90003-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cited in

(5)

• Game theory of pollution: national policies and their international effects
• The regulatory strategy in emissions trading system under costly enforcement
• Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions
• Platform exploitation in the sharing economy
• The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

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