Game theory of pollution: national policies and their international effects
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Publication:1656953
DOI10.3390/g8030030zbMath1410.91370OpenAlexW2738306966MaRDI QIDQ1656953
Kateřina Staňková, Frank Thuijsman, Katharina Schüller
Publication date: 13 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030030
Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
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