The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements

DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0056-5zbMath1276.91085OpenAlexW1494923903MaRDI QIDQ385170

Bruno Nkuiya

Publication date: 29 November 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesglobal pollutioninternational environmental agreementsstock pollution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

Game theory of pollution: national policies and their international effects

Cites Work

• Pollution control: A differential game approach
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games

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