The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements
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Publication:385170
DOI10.1007/s13235-012-0056-5zbMath1276.91085OpenAlexW1494923903MaRDI QIDQ385170
Publication date: 29 November 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Pollution control: A differential game approach
- International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
- Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
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