The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements

DOI10.1007/S13235-012-0056-5zbMATH Open1276.91085OpenAlexW1494923903MaRDI QIDQ385170FDOQ385170

Authors: Bruno Nkuiya 

Publication date: 29 November 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/132419

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• PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
• International environmental agreement: A dynamical model of emissions reduction
• Distribution of potential gains from international environmental agreements: The case of the greenhouse effect

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesglobal pollutioninternational environmental agreementsstock pollution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• How rapid should emission reduction be? A game-theoretic approach
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
• Pollution control: A differential game approach

Cited In (1)

• Game theory of pollution: national policies and their international effects

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