Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3184582
DOI10.1111/j.1475-3995.2008.00678.xzbMath1180.91220OpenAlexW1975201707MaRDI QIDQ3184582
Michèle Breton, Lucia Sbragia, Olivier Bahn, Georges Zaccour
Publication date: 21 October 2009
Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-3995.2008.00678.x
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
Related Items
International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries, Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?, Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?, HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH, Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
Cites Work
- Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
- Pollution control: A differential game approach
- Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
- Computation of characteristic function values for linear-state differential games
- Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
- International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia
