Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(02)00071-4MaRDI QIDQ951374zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zili Yang

Publication date 24 October 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(02)00071-4

zbMATH Keywords

closed-loop game modelingglobal climate changestock externality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games and control (49N70) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Control and game-theoretic models of the environment
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48313 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48327 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(12)

• Solution algorithms for regional interactions in large-scale integrated assessment models of climate change
• Optimal return and rebate mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain game
• Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
• Targets for global climate policy: an overview
• How crucial is cooperation in mitigating world climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL
• Equilibrium investment strategies in foreign environmental projects
• A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
• Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
• Computing business-as-usual with a representative agent and a pollution externality
• Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications

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