Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations

DOI10.1007/s10479-010-0795-xzbMath1301.91038OpenAlexW2140023646MaRDI QIDQ475286

Rob Dellink, Hans-Peter Weikard

Publication date: 26 November 2014

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0795-x

zbMATH Keywords

international environmental agreementsclimate agreementspartition function approachrenegotiationssharing rulesstability of coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (5)

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS UNDER INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ⋮ Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries ⋮ Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers ⋮ HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH ⋮ Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system

Cites Work

• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games

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