Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations

DOI10.1007/S10479-010-0795-XMaRDI QIDQ475286zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans-Peter Weikard, Rob Dellink

Publication date 26 November 2014

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0795-x

zbMATH Keywords

international environmental agreementsclimate agreementspartition function approachrenegotiationssharing rulesstability of coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little
• Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
• A climate agreement with full participation
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach

Cites work

• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
• Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning

Cited in

(10)

• International climate agreements under induced technological change
• On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements
• Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers
• How rapid should emission reduction be? A game-theoretic approach
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
• A climate agreement with full participation
• On the scope of climate finance to facilitate international agreement on climate change
• International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model
• Dynamic history-dependent tax and environmental compliance monitoring of risk-averse firms
• Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system

This page was built for publication: Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q475286)