Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
DOI10.1007/S10479-010-0795-XzbMATH Open1301.91038OpenAlexW2140023646MaRDI QIDQ475286FDOQ475286
Authors: Hans-Peter Weikard, Rob Dellink 
Publication date: 26 November 2014
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0795-x
Recommendations
- Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little
- Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements
- A climate agreement with full participation
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
international environmental agreementsclimate agreementspartition function approachrenegotiationssharing rulesstability of coalitions
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- Stable international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant, uncertainty and learning
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
Cited In (8)
- International climate agreements under induced technological change
- On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements
- Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers
- How rapid should emission reduction be? A game-theoretic approach
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries
- A climate agreement with full participation
- Dynamic history-dependent tax and environmental compliance monitoring of risk-averse firms
- Game-theoretic analysis for an emission-dependent supply chain in a `cap-and-trade' system
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