Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2021.10.013MaRDI QIDQ2670593zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Eichner, Gilbert Kollenbach

Publication date 11 March 2022

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.013

zbMATH Keywords

complete and incomplete contracthold-up problemOR in environment and climate changeR\&Dtechnological spillovers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• International climate agreements under induced technological change
• Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little
• Adapting to climate change: is cooperation good for the environment?

Cites work

• Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• Climate contracts: a game of emissions, investments, negotiations, and renegotiations
• Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis
• International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• Optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium
• Scarcity, growth and R\& D
• Simulating the impact of heterogeneity on stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements
• Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
• The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game

Cited in

(7)

• Adapting to climate change: is cooperation good for the environment?
• Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• International climate agreements under induced technological change
• Climate contracts: a game of emissions, investments, negotiations, and renegotiations
• The climate policy hold-up: green technologies, intellectual property rights, and the abatement incentives of international agreements
• Technological externalities and environmental policy
• The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

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