Likelihood of environmental coalitions and the number of coalition members: evidences from an IAM model
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Publication:1699064
DOI10.1007/s10479-015-1831-7zbMath1415.91222OpenAlexW2049238890MaRDI QIDQ1699064
Publication date: 16 February 2018
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1831-7
coalition theorycore propertiesdetrimental externalitiesintegrated assessment modeling (IAM)international environmental agreement (IEA)
Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
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- Environmental Statistics
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
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