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Publication date: 2 August 2010

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Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01) Game theory (91Axx)

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countermeasure against transaction information based applications, Deep graphs—A general framework to represent and analyze heterogeneous complex systems across scales, Unnamed Item, The optimal product pricing and carbon emissions reduction profit allocation of CET-covered enterprises in the cooperative supply chain, Self-evident events and the value of linking, From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games, The Chicken Braess Paradox, Max Euwe's Set-Theoretic Observations on the Game of Chess — Introductory Notes, Seven Kinds of Computable and Constructive Infelicities in Economics, THE VALUE OF COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION WHEN SERVERS ARE STRATEGIC, Unnamed Item, Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees, The Gödelian Foundations of Self-Reference,the Liar and Incompleteness: Arms Racein Complex Strategic Innovation, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Deadlines, Offer Timing, and the Search for Alternatives, Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, Unnamed Item, Manipulation in Games, The Price of Nash Equilibria in Multicast Transmissions Games, INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING, Coalition formation in social environments with logic-based agents1, Cooperative Games, Static Games, Cost Sharing in Production Economies, Game Theory and Strategic Complexity, A Method with Convergence Rates for Optimization Problems with Variational Inequality Constraints, QUANTUM INFORMATION APPROACH TO NORMAL REPRESENTATION OF EXTENSIVE GAMES, UNCERTAINTY OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE, Agents that acquire negotiation strategies using a game theoretic learning theory, DIRECT EXCHANGE IN LINEAR ECONOMIES, An Analysis of A Fishing Model with Nonlinear Harvesting Function, Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria, Reasoning about Strategies, A Generative Relation for Nash Equilibria on Symmetric Action Graph Games, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Algorithmic mechanism design, DICHOTOMY RESULT FOR INDEPENDENCE-FRIENDLY PREFIXES OF GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS, Unnamed Item, Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information, Agent negotiation of target distribution enhancing system survivability, The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem, A knowledge-based approach to adversarial decision making, Unnamed Item, Unnamed Item, Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions, An Introduction to Multi-player, Multi-choice Quantum Games: Quantum Minority Games & Kolkata Restaurant Problems, The Shapley Value as a Sustainable Cooperative Solution in Differential Games of Three Players, Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality, Models of coalition or alliance formation, The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Infinite Multiplayer Games, Unnamed Item, Embedding Coalition Logic in the Minimal Normal Multimodal Logic with Intersection, Logics for Dynamic Epistemic Behavioral Strategies, SMALL INFINITARY EPISTEMIC LOGICS, On relevant equilibria in reachability games, Technical Note—The Competitive Facility Location Problem in a Duopoly: Advances Beyond Trees, Simultaneous Penalization and Subsidization for Stabilizing Grand Cooperation, A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares, On Semantic Gamification, Unnamed Item, Efficient Black-Box Reductions for Separable Cost Sharing, Information thermodynamics of financial markets: the Glosten–Milgrom model, Market oscillations induced by the competition between value-based and trend-based investment strategies, Understanding the Other Through Social Roles, Network sharing by two mobile operators: beyond competition, cooperation, Dynamic Epistemic Logics, On Definitive Solutions of Strategic Games, Epistemic Reasoning in Life and Literature, Economically Optimal Variable Tag Length Message Authentication, Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics, Unnamed Item, Simultaneous equations with binary outcomes and social interactions, Effects of social-distancing on infectious disease dynamics: an evolutionary game theory and economic perspective, Assembly Problems, Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games, On Gradient-Based Learning in Continuous Games, Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions