A framework for studying decentralized Bayesian learning with strategic agents
DOI10.1287/STSY.2021.0092zbMATH Open1504.91226OpenAlexW4220963161MaRDI QIDQ5046016FDOQ5046016
Authors: Deepanshu Vasal, Achilleas Anastasopoulos
Publication date: 8 November 2022
Published in: Stochastic Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/stsy.2021.0092
Recommendations
social networksBayesian learninginformational cascadesperfect Bayesian equilibriumdynamic games with asymmetric information
Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- Game theory
- A course in game theory.
- Reaching a Consensus
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
- Bayesian learning in social networks.
- Non-Bayesian social learning
- Bayesian learning in social networks
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Learning from Neighbours
- Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
- Decentralized Stochastic Control with Partial History Sharing: A Common Information Approach
- Social learning equilibria
- Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Biased social learning
- Aggregate information cascades
- A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
- Dynamic Games With Asymmetric Information: Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and Sequential Decomposition
- Common Information Based Markov Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games With Asymmetric Information: Finite Games
- A Systematic Process for Evaluating Structured Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Asymmetric Information
- Strategic learning and the topology of social networks
- Asymptotic learning on Bayesian social networks
Cited In (1)
This page was built for publication: A framework for studying decentralized Bayesian learning with strategic agents
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5046016)