Biased social learning

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.006zbMath1281.91033OpenAlexW3123232651MaRDI QIDQ2435896

Helios Herrera, Johannes Hörner

Publication date: 21 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

selection biascascadesinformational herds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (7)

A Framework for Studying Decentralized Bayesian Learning with Strategic Agents ⋮ The implications of pricing on social learning ⋮ Information design through scarcity and social learning ⋮ Bayesian Social Learning from Consumer Reviews ⋮ Observational learning with position uncertainty ⋮ On Information Distortions in Online Ratings ⋮ Strategic experimentation in queues

Cites Work

• Aggregate information cascades
• Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques
• Observational learning under imperfect information
• The wisdom of the minority
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning

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