Biased social learning

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.12.006MaRDI QIDQ2435896zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Helios Herrera, Johannes Hörner

Publication date 21 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

cascadesinformational herdsselection bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Aggregate information cascades
• Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Observational learning under imperfect information
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• The wisdom of the minority

Cited in

(13)

• Biased learning under ambiguous information
• Information choice in a social learning experiment
• Information design through scarcity and social learning
• Observational learning with position uncertainty
• On information distortions in online ratings
• A framework for studying decentralized Bayesian learning with strategic agents
• Bayesian social learning from consumer reviews
• Strategic experimentation in queues
• The implications of pricing on social learning
• Voting to persuade
• Social learning with partial and aggregate information: experimental evidence
• Innovation adoption by forward-looking social learners
• Information projection and selective search: implement now or draw again

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