Observational learning under imperfect information

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00179-9zbMath1068.91008OpenAlexW2002598678MaRDI QIDQ1885424

Shachar Kariv, Boğaçhan Çelen

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00179-9

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric informationImperfect informationHerd behaviorInformational cascades

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (19)

Hiding opinions by minimizing disclosed information: an obfuscation-based opinion dynamics model ⋮ Social learning with endogenous observation ⋮ Spread of (mis)information in social networks ⋮ Information design through scarcity and social learning ⋮ Inertia in social learning from a summary statistic ⋮ Taking the road less traveled by: Does conversation eradicate pernicious cascades? ⋮ Biased social learning ⋮ Social learning with coordination motives ⋮ Observational learning with position uncertainty ⋮ Interacting information cascades: on the movement of conventions between groups ⋮ The wisdom of the minority ⋮ Aggregate information cascades ⋮ Imitation and luck: An experimental study on social sampling ⋮ HERDING WITH COSTLY INFORMATION ⋮ On Information Distortions in Online Ratings ⋮ Strategic experimentation in queues ⋮ Preferences, Homophily, and Social Learning ⋮ Learning to Coordinate in Social Networks ⋮ Bayesian social learning with local interactions

Cites Work

• Word-of-mouth learning.
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning

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