Learning to coordinate in social networks
DOI10.1287/OPRE.2015.1381zbMATH Open1348.91067OpenAlexW3124594608MaRDI QIDQ2830745FDOQ2830745
Authors: Pooya Molavi, Ceyhun Eksin, Alejandro Ribeiro, Ali Jadbabaie 
Publication date: 31 October 2016
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/174055891b4fd9f73e841af165f62a54237cd7bf
Recommendations
Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamic games (91A25) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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Cited In (14)
- Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games
- On learning to coordinate: random bits help, insightful normal forms, and competency isomorphisms
- Preface to the special issue on information and decisions in social and economic networks
- Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
- Computational social choice for coordination in agent networks
- Dynamics on linear influence network games under stochastic environments
- Learning and coordination with dispersed information
- Strategic learning and the topology of social networks
- Social closeness can help, harm and be irrelevant in solving pure coordination problems
- Social learning in coordination games: does status matter?
- Distributed dynamic reinforcement of efficient outcomes in multiagent coordination and network formation
- Coordination and social learning
- Dynamic coordination with individual learning
- Social learning with coordination motives
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