Dynamic coordination with individual learning

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.005zbMath1278.91023OpenAlexW2086723411MaRDI QIDQ665081

Colin Stewart, Jakub Steiner, Amil Dasgupta

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/174743/1/GEBrevision-resubmit.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

delaylearningcoordinationcommon knowledgeglobal games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (5)

Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation ⋮ Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games ⋮ Strategic Delay in Global Games ⋮ Coordination and social learning ⋮ The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: an experimental study

Cites Work

• Common belief foundations of global games
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Dynamic coordination games
• Coordination and delay in global games
• Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects
• Learning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Common Learning
• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks

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