The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.018zbMATH Open1296.91075OpenAlexW2147287754MaRDI QIDQ2016237FDOQ2016237

Boğaçhan Çelen, Kyle Hyndman, Francesco Brindisi

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.018

zbMATH Keywords

experimentinformationdelaycoordinationglobal games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
• The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
• Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment
• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
• Coordination and delay in global games
• Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems
• Dynamic coordination with individual learning
• Equilibria in a dynamic global game: the role of cohort effects
• The right Choice at the right time: A herding experiment in endogenous time
• Investment dynamics with common and private values
• Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study

Cited In (4)

• Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
• Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities
• Conformity and influence
• An experiment of social learning with endogenous timing

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