Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities
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Publication:6494260
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.006WikidataQ129681888 ScholiaQ129681888MaRDI QIDQ6494260
Publication date: 30 April 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25)
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