Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1366zbMath1169.91355OpenAlexW2004166608MaRDI QIDQ3394947

Ed Hopkins, Tatiana Kornienko

Publication date: 11 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/5890294/bejte.2007.7.1.1366.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)? ⋮ How to translate results from auctions to procurements ⋮ Asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities

Cites Work

• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case

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