Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1366zbMATH Open1169.91355OpenAlexW2004166608MaRDI QIDQ3394947FDOQ3394947

Authors: Ed Hopkins, Tatiana Kornienko 

Publication date: 11 September 2009

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/5890294/bejte.2007.7.1.1366.pdf

Recommendations

• Comparative statics in first price auctions
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Effects of competition in first-price auctions
• Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case

Cited In (7)

• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• The Power of Two Prices: Beyond Cross-Monotonicity
• How to translate results from auctions to procurements
• Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities
• Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
• Asymmetric first price auctions

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