Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1817250
DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0040zbMATH Open0860.90040OpenAlexW2060965809MaRDI QIDQ1817250FDOQ1817250
Authors: Erwin Amann, Wolfgang Leininger 
Publication date: 19 December 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0040
Recommendations
existenceuniquenessincomplete informationBayesian equilibriumasymmetric all-pay auctionstwo-player auction games
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)
Cited In (68)
- Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests
- Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information
- Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments
- Two-stage elimination games
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types
- Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions
- Information architecture and its impact on the equilibrium for all-pay auction models
- Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
- Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
- Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
- Unfair contests
- Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs
- Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
- All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
- Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
- Contests with insurance
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
- All-pay auctions with asymmetric effort constraints
- Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: with experimental test
- A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
- The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
- Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue
- Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
- Effective contests
- Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
- A simple model of competition between teams
- All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
- A tug-of-war team contest
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
- Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
- Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
- The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
- A Blotto game with multi-dimensional incomplete information
- A class of \(N\)-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information
- Discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
- Private versus complete information in auctions
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Contest architecture
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
- Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
- Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
- The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
- Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
- All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
- Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions
- Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning
- Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
- Continuous time contests with private information
- Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions
- Information acquisition in conflicts
- All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
- Sequential two-prize contests
- Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
- All-pay war
This page was built for publication: Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1817250)
