Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0040zbMath0860.90040OpenAlexW2060965809MaRDI QIDQ1817250

Publication date: 19 December 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0040

zbMATH Keywords

existence uniqueness incomplete information Bayesian equilibrium asymmetric all-pay auctions two-player auction games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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