Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case

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Publication:1817250

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0040zbMath0860.90040OpenAlexW2060965809MaRDI QIDQ1817250

Erwin Amann, Wolfgang Leininger

Publication date: 19 December 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0040




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