Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.09.002MaRDI QIDQ660091zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kiho Yoon

Publication date 25 January 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

mechanismrandom assignmentexpenditure inefficiencyrank-order ruleswinner-take-all assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3881695 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3573060 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
• Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
• Inequalities for Linear Combinations of Order Statistics from Restricted Families
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Lottery rather than waiting-line auction
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Stochastic orders
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Cited in

(10)

• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
• Redistribution through markets
• A model of access in the absence of markets
• An experimental study of voting with costly delay
• Efficient voting with penalties
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

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