Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
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Publication:2256859
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0778-7zbMath1319.91083OpenAlexW2267661888MaRDI QIDQ2256859
Publication date: 23 February 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2012_11.pdf
collusionfirst-price auction(Bayes) correlated equilibriumbid coordination mechanismbidder-optimal signal structurepublic and private signals
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (5)
All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Optimal information exchange in contests
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